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I. INTRODUCTION
Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides in part:
"When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously,
would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subse-
quent measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable con-
duct in connection with the event."' This principle first developed
under the common law to encourage individuals to repair potentially
hazardous conditions to further public safety.2 The premise of the
1. FED. R. EvID. 407.
2. See, e.g., Terre Haute & I. R.R. v. Clem, 123 Ind. 15, 19, 23 N.E. 965, 966 (1890) ("A
rule which so operates as to deter men from profiting by experience, and availing themselves of
new information, has nothing to commend it."); Morse v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry., 30 Minn.
465, 468, 16 N.W. 358, 359 (1883) ("The more careful a person is, the more regard he has for
the lives of others, the more likely he would be to [make repairs], and it would seem unjust that
he could not do so without being liable to have such acts construed as an admission of prior
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Rule is that individuals would be discouraged from improving safety
procedures if evidence of these subsequent measures could be used
against them in suits arising from the prior conditions. When Con-
gress enacted Federal Rule of Evidence 407, the Rules incorporated
the common law standard on subsequent measures.3
The exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures under Rule
407 is not absolute. Rule 407 provides four exceptions under which
evidence of subsequent measures may be admissible. One exception
in particular-impeachment-has created significant controversy
because it has the potential of swallowing up the Rule. The impeach-
ment exception is potentially dangerous in two respects. First, when
evidence of subsequent measures is introduced to impeach a defend-
ant's testimony, the natural implication is an inference of negligence
or culpable conduct by the defendant, which is the precise result that
Rule 407 seeks to prevent. Therefore, when a defendant states that
his place or product was safe and in no need of repair or improve-
ment, evidence of subsequent measures may cause a jury to doubt the
safety of the defendant's place or product and naturally lead the jury.
to assume that the defendant would not have 'made the repair or
improvement unless the place or product was unsafe. The result is an
inference of negligence against the defendant. Second, the impeach-
ment exception can be manipulated by a plaintiff's counsel in order to
introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence of subsequent measures
under the guise of impeachment evidence.5 This would occur when a
plaintiff's counsel called the defendant or his witness on direct exami-
nation, asked the witness if the defendant's place or product was safe,
and then impeached the witness with evidence of subsequent
negligence."); see also 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 283, at 151
(3d ed. 1940) ("[A]dmissions of such acts... would discourage all owners, even those who had
genuinely been careful, from improving the place or thing that had caused the injury, because
they would fear the evidential use of such acts to their disadvantage.").
3. The advisory committee's note states in part: "The other, and more impressive,
ground for exclusion rests on a social policy of encouraging people to take, or at least not
discouraging them from taking, steps in furtherance of added safety." FED. R. EVID. 407
advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 226.
4. Rule 407 provides in part: "This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of
subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or
feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment." FED. R. EVID. 407.
The four exceptions listed in the rule are illustrative and do not constitute an exhaustive list.
23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5290, at
148 (1980) (("The list of permissible uses in Rule 407 is illustrative, not exclusive.") (footnote
omitted)).
5. See 10 J. MOORE & H. BENDIX, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 407.04, at IV-159
(2d ed. 1981) ("[T]he trial judge should guard against the improper admission of [such]
evidence ... to prove prior negligence under the guise of impeachment.").
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measures. 6
Although the impeachment exception has the potential to vitiate
the effectiveness of Rule 407 in a given case, it is not without merit.
Without the impeachment exception to Rule 407, the defendant
would be unduly favored because he would have the unlimited ability
to exaggerate the safety of his place or product or to make inconsis-
tent statements.7 Fairness in the administration of justice and the
quest for truth demand that a defendant's self-serving assertions not
go unchallenged.' Because Rule 407 promotes the important social
interests of encouraging repairs and improvements, while the
impeachment exception to the Rule furthers the administration of jus-
tice, it is necessary to achieve a balance between the policies underly-
ing the Rule and its impeachment exception. Such a balance would
protect the policy concerns of the Rule, as well as the litigation inter-
ests of the parties promoted by the exception.
This Comment analyzes the historical development of the
impeachment exception to the common law rule governing the admis-
sion of evidence of subsequent measures. Section IIA discusses the
policies supporting the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures.
Section IIB analyzes cases interpreting the subsequent measures rule
and focuses upon three scenarios: A defendant or his witness testify-
ing falsely or in a misleading manner about a subsequent measure; a
defendant or his witness testifying that the place or product was safe;
and a plaintiff's counsel calling the defendant or his witness on direct
examination and subsequently impeaching the witness with evidence
of subsequent measures. Section III then analyzes the application of
Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which codified the com-
mon law rule relating to evidence of subsequent measures, by the fed-
eral courts. In addition, Section IV compares the use of impeachment
under Rules 407, 408 and 411 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Finally, Section V suggests that limitations should be placed on the
6. See Note, The Admissibility of Subsequent Remedial Measures in Strict Liability
Actions, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. !415, 1429 (1982) ("If plaintiff's counsel can maneuver a
defendant's witness into suggesting ... that the defendant's place or product was as safe as
possible, then a court would receive the subsequent repair evidence to impeach.") [hereinafter
Note, Admissibility of Remedial Measures]; see also Rossi, The Ban on Evidence of Subsequent
Remedial Measures, 7 CORNELL L.F. 6, 8 (1981) (("[I]f the plaintiff's counsel can push the
defense witness into suggestions that the defendant's place or product was safe . . . courts
everywhere would receive subsequent change evidence under, the . . . impeachment
exception.") (footnote omitted)).
7. C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 4, § 5289, at 147 ((The impeachment exception
is "necessary to prevent defendants from taking advantage of the rule by making sweeping
assertions of the safety of their prior actions.") (footnote omitted)).
8. FED. R. EvID. 102.
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use of impeachment under Rule 407 in order to promote a necessary
balance between the achievement of the social interests promoted by
the subsequent measures rule, and the litigation interests promoted by
the impeachment exception to the rule.
II. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE
IMPEACHMENT EXCEPTION
A. The Policies Underlying the Rule Excluding Evidence of
Subsequent Measures
The rule excluding evidence of subsequent measures is founded
upon two premises: First, the policy promoting the proper adminis-
tration of justice, and second, the policy promoting a social concern.9
The first premise is derived from Hart v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Rail-
way,' O in which the English Court of Exchequer Chamber held that
subsequent remedial conduct should not be viewed as an admission of
negligence. In reaching its decision, the Hart court reasoned:
[P]eople do not furnish evidence against themselves simply by
adopting a new plan in order to prevent the recurrence of an acci-
dent.... [A] proposition to the contrary would be barbarous....
[The court would be holding] that, because the world gets wiser as
it gets older, therefore it was foolish before. "
Rather than viewing subsequent remedial conduct as an admission of
negligence, the advisory committee's note to Rule 407 adopts the view
that "the conduct is equally consistent with injury by mere accident
or through contributory negligence."' 2
Other authorities have argued that evidence of subsequent meas-
ures is irrelevant, or at best only marginally relevant, to the issue of
negligence. 3 Three reasons are offered in support of this argument:
First, they argue that subsequent measures are not necessarily proof
of negligence because alternative explanations exist that are sufficient
to explain the "repair" conduct. For example, the repair conduct
may reflect advances in technology, or other economic factors. 4
9. See FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 226.
10. 21 L.T.R. 261 (1869).
11. Id. at 263; see also Columbia & P.S. R.R. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202, 207 (1892)
("[T]he taking of precautions against the future is not to be construed as an adrhission of
responsibility for the past.").
12. FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 226.
13. See Note, Chart v. General Motors Corp.: Did It Chart the Way for Admission of
Evidence of Subsequent Remedial Measures in Products Liability Actions?, 41 OHIO ST. L.J.
211, 214 (1980).
14. See Note, Admissibility of Remedial Measures, supra note 6, at 1418.
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Accordingly, the subsequent measures may be entirely irrelevant in a
suit concerning an injury suffered under the prior conditions. Second,
"a defendant's subsequent repair activities often stem from his discov-
ery or realization that the object is capable of causing harm, rather
than his negligence in failing to foresee the harm."15 And third, the
potential for "misleading, confusing, or unduly prejudicing the jury"
often outweighs the probative value of the evidence. 6
These arguments have not gone unchallenged. Critics of the
Rule contend that evidence of subsequent measures is indeed relevant
proof of negligence. Because negligence is a "possible inference from
the evidence," 17 the evidence is relevant, for relevance means "any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence." '18
The second and "more impressive" 19 premise of the Rule pro-
motes the social policy interest of encouraging people to take precau-
tionary measures or to repair potentially hazardous conditions
existing under their control.20 This policy was best explained in
Morse v. Minneapolis & Saint Louis Railway,21 in which the Supreme
Court of Minnesota upheld the exclusion of evidence of subsequent
measures. The Morse court reasoned:
The more careful a person is, the more regard he has for the lives
of others, the more likely he would be to [make repairs], and it
would seem unjust that he could not do so without being liable to
have such acts construed as an admission of prior negligence. We
think such a rule puts an unfair interpretation upon human con-
duct, and virtually holds out an inducement for continued
negligence.22
Throughout the years, the Rule's social policy of encouraging
repairs has been criticized by those who believe that this premise is
obsolete.23 Critics argue that most manufacturers have an economic
self-interest in repairing the allegedly hazardous condition, in order to
15. Id. at 1419 (footnote omitted).
16. See Note, supra note 13, at 214.
17. Id. at 215.
18. FED. R. EvID. 401.
19. FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 226.
20. See supra note 2.
21. 30 Minn. 465, 16 N.W. 358 (1883).
22. Id. at 470, 16 N.W. at 359.
23. See 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 164, at 381 (1985) (The
"validity" of excluding evidence of subsequent measures in order to encourage repairs "is open
to serious doubt."); see also C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 4, § 5282, at 93 (The
policy of excluding evidence of subsequent measures in order to encourage repairs has been
heavily criticized and is no longer a sound justification for the Rule.).
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avoid negative publicity.24 Critics further maintain that most manu-
facturers do not know about the Rule, and that even those who do
know are familiar with the Rule's many exceptions. 25 Finally, critics
claim that insurance companies usually urge manufacturers to make
repairs.26
These critics of the Rule have overlooked the fact that the need
to avoid unfavorable publicity may still be outweighed by the expense
of altering a product that the manufacturer believes is safe.27 Further-
more, once an injury has been suffered, the manufacturer may already
have received negative publicity, and as such the motivation of avoid-
ing further publicity may not be a significant inducement to undertake
subsequent measures.
Despite this criticism, the principle of excluding evidence of sub-
sequent measures was codified in Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. 28  The advisory committee explained that the Rule was
included because evidence of subsequent measures is not an admission
of negligence, and also because exclusion of this evidence serves the
important social policy of encouraging repairs. 29
B. The Evolution of the Impeachment Exception
1. THE PERIOD FROM 1885 TO 1950
The impeachment exception to the Rule excluding evidence of
subsequent measures evolved through the common law from the latter
part of the 19th century to the codification of the Federal Rules of
Evidence in 1975. And, until about 1950, the use of evidence of sub-
sequent measures to impeach was relatively uniform throughout the
state courts.3 0 The defendant or his witness would typically raise the
issue by testifying to some aspect of the safety of the prior condition,
which the plaintiff had alleged was hazardous. 31 On cross-examina-
tion or in rebuttal testimony, the plaintiff would offer evidence of the
defendant's subsequent measures in order to contradict or rebut the
24. See Note, supra note 13, at 216.
25. See D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 23, at 381 ("Many persons take
subsequent remedial measures wholly unaware that there exists an evidential rule of exclusion,
and those who are aware of such a rule are likely to know that the rule is easily
circumvented."); Note, supra note 13, at 216.
26. Note, supra note 13, at 216.
27. See Note, 67 MARQ. L. REv. 188, 191 (1983).
28. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
29. FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 226 (Evidence of
subsequent measures is not an admission of negligence, and excluding such evidence
encourages repairs and improvements.).
30. See infra notes 37-141 and accompanying text.
31. Id.
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claim made by the defendant, thereby impeaching the credibility of
the testimony of the defendant, or his witness.32
The defendant's testimony, which raised the danger of impeach-
ment by the plaintiff, took one of three forms. The defendant might
make false or misleading assertions about the safety of the allegedly
hazardous condition. The defendant also might assert that repairs
were made before the accident, when, in fact, they had been made
after the accident. Finally, the defendant might merely proclaim that
the condition was safe, or in no need of repair.3 In each of these
scenarios, permitting the defendant to make self-serving assertions
without subjecting him to impeachment was thought to give the
defendant an unfair advantage.3 4 In seeking to preserve fairness
between the litigants, the courts admitted evidence of subsequent
measures for the sole purpose of impeachment, and not for any infer-
ence of negligence. 35  To avoid the inference of negligence, courts
instructed juries as to the limited purpose for which the evidence was
admitted.36
a. False or Misleading Claims by the Defendant as to the Taking
of Subsequent Measures
During the period from approximately 1885 to 1950, the major-
ity of cases concerning subsequent measures involved the first scena-
rio.37 When faced with this scenario, the courts allowed plaintiffs to
32. Id.
33. See infra notes 100-41 and accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., Virginia & North Carolina Wheel Co. v. Chalkley, 98 Va. 62, 65, 34 S.E. 976
(1900) (upholding the trial court's decision to permit the plaintiff to offer evidence of the
subsequent repair because, otherwise, the defendant would be permitted to prove facts that the
plaintiff was denied the right of disproving).
35. See, e.g., Choctaw, 0. & G. R.R. v. McDade, 191 U.S. 64, 69 (1903) (Supreme Court
of the United States upholding the trial court's instruction to the jury that the evidence was
solely admitted to impeach and not to infer negligence); see also Bedgood v. T.R. Miller Mill
Co., 202 Ala. 299, 80 So. 364 (1918) (upholding the introduction of evidence of the subsequent
measure to contradict or impeach, and not to show anterior negligence); Lombardi v.
Yulinsky, 98 N.J.L. 332, 119 A. 873 (1923) (upholding a limiting instruction to the jury that
the evidence was admitted to impeach the defendant, and not to prove the defendant was
negligent); Tise v. Thomasville, 151 N.C. 281, 65 S.E. 1007 (1909) (upholding the right of the
plaintiff to introduce evidence that a hole was filled by the defendant after an accident to show
that repairs were made, not to prove negligence).
36. See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 252, at 545 (1954).
37. See, e.g., Taylorville v. Stafford, 196 Il. 288, 63 N.E. 624 (1902); Garshon v. Aaron,
330 111. App. 540, 71 N.E.2d 799 (1947); Chicago & E. R.R. v. Barnes, 10 Ind. App. 460, 38
N.E. 428 (1894); Butkovitch v. Centerville Block Coal Co., 188 Iowa 1176, 177 N.W. 479
(1920); Beck v. Beck Coal & Mining Co., 180 Iowa 1, 162 N.W. 861 (1917); Parker v. City of
Ottumwa, 113 Iowa 649, 85 N.W. 805 (1901); Rogers v. Kansas Co-Operative Refining Co., 91
Kan. 351, 137 P. 991 (1914); Bell-Knox Coal Co. v. Gregory, 152 Ky. 415, 153 S.W. 465
(1913); Goodell v. Sviokcla, 262 Mass. 317, 159 N.E. 728 (1928); Clemens v. Gem Fibre
1988]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [
impeach defendants or their witnesses with evidence of subsequent
measures to prevent the defendant from achieving an unfair advan-
tage by manipulating the exclusionary nature of the rule of subse-
quent measures. The Court of Appeals of New York espoused this
position in Bush v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad.38 In
Bush, an employee was fatally injured after attempting to cross a
wooden bridge over a railroad with his employer, in a traction engine
and separator, used for threshing farm land.39 Before crossing, the
two men examined the bridge and inquired about its safety." The
pathmaster assured them that the bridge was safe, and the two
attempted to cross.4 While they were midway across the bridge, two
sleepers on the bridge gave way, and the two men fell to the railroad
tracks below.42 After the accident, the railroad company placed four
or five sleepers in place of the previous two.4 3 At trial, the railroad's
expert witness testified that the bridge was as strong as before the
accident.' On appeal, the court upheld the right of the plaintiff, the
employee's widow, to offer evidence of the subsequent repair on the
express ground that it contradicted the testimony of the railroad's
witness as to the strength of the bridge.45 Evidence of subsequent
measures in this case was relevant to establishing whether the
strength of the bridge was the same before and after the accident.46
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia reached a similar
holding in Virginia & North Carolina Wheel Co. v. Chalkley.47 In
Chalkley, an employee of the wheel company was injured while oper-
ating a circular saw.48 An expert witness, called on behalf of the
wheel company, testified that "the machinery was in the same condi-
tion when exhibited to the jury that it was when [Chalkley] was
injured. '49 The court upheld the trial court's decision to permit the
Package Co., 153 Mich. 495, 117 N.W. 187 (1908); McDonald v. City of Duluth, 93 Minn.
206, 100 N.W. 1102 (1904); Schloemer v. St. Louis Transit Co., 204 Mo. 99, 102 S.W. 565
(1907); Tetherow v. St. Joseph & P.M. Ry., 98 Mo. 74, 11 S.W. 310 (1889); Overby v. Mears
Mining Co., 144 Mo. App. 363, 128 S.W. 813 (1910); Missouri, K & T Ry. v. St. Clair, 21 Tex.
Civ. App. 345, 51 S.W. 666 (1899); Duggan v. Heaphy, 85 Vt. 515, 83 A. 726 (1912); Weaver
v. Wheeling Traction Co., 91 W. Va. 528, 114 S.E. 131 (1922).
38. 166 N.Y. 210, 59 N.E. 838 (1910).
39. Id. at 214-15, 59 N.E. at 839-40.
40. Id. at 214, 59 N.E. at 839.
41. Id. at 214, 59 N.E. at 839-40.
42. Id. at 214-15, 59 N.E. at 840.
43. Id. at 216, 59 N.E. at 840.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 98 Va. 62, 34 S.E. 976 (1900).
48. Id. at 63, 34 S.E. at 976.
49. Id. at 65, 34 S.E. at 977.
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plaintiff to offer evidence of the subsequent repair to the circular saw,
because "otherwise, the [wheel company] would be permitted to prove
facts to establish its defen[s]e which the plaintiff was denied the right
of disproving."50
Subsequent to these two state court decisions, the Supreme Court
of the United States, in Choctaw, Oklahoma & Gulf Railroad v.
McDade, 5 upheld the use of subsequent measures evidence to contra-
dict a defendant's misleading testimony,52 in order to achieve fairness
in litigation. The plaintiff, who had the unenviable job of riding on
top of trains to give tiack signals to the conductor below, was fatally
injured when his head struck a water spout that hung vertically from
a water tank over the railroad tracks.53 At trial, the railroad com-
pany's witness testified as to the height of the water spout, and
claimed that it was not dangerously low.54 Before the measurements
were taken, but after the accident, the water spout had been recon-
structed.55 The Supreme Court upheld the trial court's ruling admit-
ting evidence of the subsequent reconstruction solely for the proper
determination of the measurements, with a limiting instruction to the
jury.5 6
Five years after Choctaw, the Supreme Court of Washington, in
Gustafson v. A.J. West Lumber Co.,57 upheld the use of evidence of
subsequent measures to impeach a defendant who had denied the haz-
ardous condition of a passageway. The plaintiff, an employee of the
lumber company, was injured while passing through a passageway
located near an electric saw.59 The plaintiff alleged that the passage-
way was too narrow, causing him to stumble and fall into the saw,
which severed his arm.6° At trial, the lumber company denied that a
passageway had ever existed along the length of the saw.6' The court
upheld the trial court's decision to permit the plaintiff's counsel to
introduce evidence that the passageway had been subsequently wid-
ened to facilitate passage in order to dispute the company's denial of
50. Id.
51. 191 U.S. 64 (1903).
52. Id. at 69.
53. Id. at 65.
54. Id. at 69.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 51 Wash. 25, 97 P. 1094 (1908).
58. Id. at 28, 97 P. at 1096.
59. Id. at 27, 97 P. at 1095.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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the passageway.62
As courts began to perceive the need to contradict misleading
and false statements made by defendants, the impeachment exception
to subsequent measures evidence rapidly gained acceptance. The
Supreme Court of Alabama adopted the use of subsequent measures
evidence for this limited purpose in Bedgood v. T R. Miller Mill Co. 63
In Bedgood, an employee of a mill company lost his arm and suffered
lacerations and bruises after attempting to place a belt on the pulley of
a ripper saw while the drive shaft was still revolving. 64 After the acci-
dent, the mill company boxed in the shaft between the pulley and the
ripper saw post.65 At trial, the company testified that it had not
attempted to reduce the danger of the ripper saw after the plaintiff's
injury.66 Reversing the trial court, the Supreme Court of Alabama
held that it was proper for the plaintiff's counsel to introduce evi-
dence of the subsequent protective measure "not to show anterior
negligence ... but to contradict or impeach" the expert witness' testi-
mony that no subsequent measures had been implemented.67
Court's also have allowed the introduction of evidence of subse-
quent measures when defendants or their witnesses have unintention-
ally made incorrect statements. For example, in Humphreys v.
Chicago, Milwaukee, Saint Paul & Pacific Railroad,68 the plaintiff
sued a railroad company after a train struck and killed ten mules and
a horse that had broken through a gate separating the plaintiff's land
from the railroad tracks.69 The plaintiff alleged that the gate was
insufficient for its purpose. 70 The railroad's expert testified as to the
strength and good condition of a new gate installed after the accident,
and not about the gate existing at the time of the accident.7" The
appellate court upheld the trial court's decision to permit the plain-
tiff's counsel to introduce evidence about the new gate, reasoning that
the subsequent measures evidence was competent to impeach the rail-
road's expert and to clarify whether the new gate or the old gate was
sound.72
62. Id. at 27-28, 97 P. at 1095-96.
63. 202 Ala. 299, 80 So. 364 (1918).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 301, 80 So. at 366.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. 83 S.W.2d 586 (Mo. Ct. App. 1935).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 587.
71. Id. at 589.
72. Id.
[Vol. 42:901
IMPEACHMENT EXCEPTION TO RULE 407
b. False or Misleading Claims by the Defendant as to the Timing
of Subsequent Measures
The second scenario also involves false and misleading testi-
mony. It is, however, distinct from the first scenario in that a defend-
ant or his witness testifies that a change to the allegedly hazardous
condition was made before the accident, when it was actually made
after the accident. When faced with this scenario, courts have consid-
ered that the defendant opened himself up to impeachment with his
blatantly false testimony.
In the early stages of the period from approximately 1885 to
about 1950, evidence of subsequent measures to impeach a defendant
testifying in this manner was not automatically admissible. In the
1890 case of Lang v. Sanger,7 3 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
refused to admit evidence of a subsequent repair to contradict a
defendant who had testified falsely about the timing of a repair.74 The
plaintiff, a sawyer in the defendant's sawmill, lost his thumb and fore-
finger after his foot became caught on a knot in the floor of the gang-
way, causing his hand to strike the teeth of a nearby saw." The
defendant's witness testified that any defects in the gangway had been
repaired before the accident.76 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held
that the evidence that the gangway had been repaired after the acci-
dent was not admissible to rebut the testimony on the time of the
repair.77 The court feared that the jury mightperceive the subsequent
repair as an admission of negligence, even though it might not have
affected the safety of the gangway at all. The court argued that even
though the saw-guard may have been out of repair, the disrepair may
have been minimal, and therefore may not have caused the injury.
The court thus concluded that the defendant was entitled to this
presumption. 78
Other state courts have admitted evidence of subsequent meas-
ures for impeachment purposes in this instance. 79 Three years after
Sanger, a Kentucky court, in Louisville & N.R.R. v. Woodward,80 held
that the plaintiff could introduce evidence of the timing of corrective
73. 76 Wis. 71, 44 N.W. 1095 (1890).
74. Id. at 75, 44 N.W. at 1096.
75. Id. at 72, 44 N.W. at 1095.
76. Id. at 73, 44 N.W. at 1095.
77. Id. at 75, 44 N.W. at 1096.
78. Id.
79. The following cases support this proposition: Holt v. Oval Oak Mfg. Co., 177 N.C.
170, 98 S.E. 369 (1919); Anderson v. Conway Lumber Co., 99 S.C. 100, 82 S.E. 984 (1914);
Frankfort & Versailles Traction Co. v. Hulette, 32 Ky. L. Rptr. 732, 106 S.W. 1193 (Ct. App.
1908); Clonts v. Laclede Gaslight Co., 160 Mo. App. 456, 140 S.W. 970 (1911).
80. 15 Ky. L. Rptr. 445 (abstract) (1893).
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measures to impeach a defendant's testimony on the issue.8 ' A rail-
road company witness testified that projecting railroad ties of unusual
and dangerous length were sawed off before the accident.8 2 The court
allowed the plaintiff to contradict the railroad's witness with evidence
that the ties had been sawed off after the accident.8 3
Similarly, in Tise v. Thomasville, 14 the Supreme Court of North
Carolina upheld the admission of evidence of a subsequent repair to
contradict testimony that the repair was made before the accident. In
Tise, the plaintiff was injured when her horse stepped into a pothole in
a street, causing her to fall.8 5 Representatives for the city of Thomas-
ville testified that the hole had already been filled before the acci-
dent.86 The court allowed the plaintiff to introduce evidence that the
hole was filled after the accident, in order "to show that the repairs
were made afterwards-not that the repairs were evidence tending to
prove negligence."8 "
A case that raised truthfulness as an issue arising from the intro-
duction of evidence of subsequent measures was Koskoff v.
Goldman.88 In Koskoff, the plaintiff brought a wrongful death action
on behalf of his wife, who died after falling from a second-floor plat-
form when the stairway railing collapsed. 9 The landlord of the prem-
ises testified at trial that the railing was replaced on the day before the
accident.9 ° The plaintiff's witness had already testified that when he
inspected the railing after the accident, it was in disrepair, thereby
implying that any repair must have been made after the accident.9'
The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut upheld the admission of
the testimony given by the plaintiff's witness, because a "question of
veracity was thus presented, and it was one which had an important
bearing upon the ultimate issue. '"" The court emphasized that the
trial court had given a limiting instruction to the jury and that the
landlord had already testified about a replacement.93
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, in Lombardi v. Yulinsky, 94
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. 151 N.C. 281, 65 S.E. 1007 (1909).
85. Id. at 282, 65 S.E. at 1007.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 282, 283, 65 S.E. at 1007.
88. 86 Conn. 415, 85 A. 588 (1912).
89. Id. at 418, 85 A. at 590.
90. Id. at 421, 85 A. at 591.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 98 N.J.L. 332, 119 A. 873 (1923).
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echoed the perception of the Koskoff court that subsequent measures
evidence may affect the credibility of a defendant's witness." In Lom-
bardi, the plaintiff was fatally injured when his automobile struck a
pile of bricks left in the roadway by the defendant. 96 At trial, the
defendant testified that, prior to the accident, he had installed danger
lights on the pile of bricks.97 On cross-examination, counsel for the
plaintiff asked the defendant if, in fact, the danger lights were placed
on the brick pile after the accident.9" The court held this question
was proper "for the purpose of affecting the credibility of the defend-
ant as a witness," but added that the trial judge should have
instructed the jury that evidence of the subsequent measures was
admitted solely for its bearing upon the defendant's credibility, and
not as evidence of negligence. 99
c. The Claim that the Place or Product Was Safe
Prior to the Accident
The courts have admitted evidence of subsequent measures to
impeach the testimony of a defendant or his witness who has merely
stated that the allegedly hazardous condition was safe, or that
changes were not necessary or customary. This third scenario was
perhaps the most threatening to the rule excluding evidence of subse-
quent measures. Impeaching a defendant or his witness who testifies
in this manner threatens the rule because the defendant has merely
stated an opinion, vital to his defense, about the safety of the allegedly
hazardous condition. He has not made an obviously false or mislead-
ing statement as to the taking or the timing of subsequent measures in
order to achieve an unfair advantage by manipulating the exclusion-
ary nature of the subsequent measure rule. The fact that evidence of
subsequent measures should not to be construed as an admission of
negligence'00 means that it is possible for a defendant or his witness to
believe that a particular condition in question is safe, and yet change
that condition for other reasons. In such a situation, a subsequent
measure would not be inconsistent with a defendant's belief that the
condition in question was safe and not in need of repair. Evidence of
subsequent measures should not be admissible for impeachment pur-
poses in such a situation.
Notwithstanding such problems, in the period from approxi-
95. Id. at 334, 119 A. at 874.
96. Id. at 333, 119 A. at 874.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 334, 119 A. at 874.
100. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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mately 1885 to about 1950, the majority of state courts permitted
plaintiffs to impeach defendants with evidence of subsequent measures
when confronted with this factual scenario.'0° The Supreme Court of
Rhode Island dealt with this particular issue in Yeaw v. Williams." 2
In Yeaw, the plaintiff was injured when his horse struck a hitching
post far out into the road. 103 At trial, the defendant called a surveyor
who testified that, in his opinion, the position of the post did not
render the highway unsafe.' °4 On cross-examination, the plaintiff's
counsel asked the surveyor whether the post had been removed after
the accident."0 5 The surveyor responded that it had been removed.'0 6
The court held that the subsequent removal of the post was admissible
testimony because it was offered "to discredit the witness by showing
that his conduct was inconsistent with his testimony."' 07 The court
reasoned: "[I]f that witness honestly thought the post was no defect,
why should he remove it?"'0 8
Perhaps the most elaborate defense for the admissibility of subse-
quent measures evidence in a case of putative safety was stated by an
Ohio court in Bond Hill Village v. Atkinson. 0 9 The plaintiff in Atkin-
son was fatally injured when she fell on a sidewalk."' 0 A witness for
the village testified that he carefully examined the sidewalk in ques-
tion immediately after the accident and found it in good condition."'I
On cross-examination, counsel for the plaintiff introduced evidence
that the sidewalk was repaired within eight days of the accident.' 12
Although the court held that this evidence was not admissible to
prove negligence on behalf of the village, it viewed the evidence as
proper for impeachment purposes:
[The evidence is] legitimate and proper cross-examination ... to
test [the witness'] credibility and throw light on the question
whether his statement as to the safe condition of the sidewalk at
the time of the accident was trustworthy and entitled to credit. If
on such cross-examination the witness should state facts, which
would limit or discredit his statement in chief, the plaintiff should
101. See infra notes 102-41 and accompanying text.
102. 15 R.I. 20, 23 A. 33 (1885).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 22, 23 A. at 34.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. 16 Ohio C.C. 470 (1898).
110. Id. at 471.
111. Id. at 473.
112. Id.
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have the benefit of such statements." 13
The court supported its holding by drawing an analogy between sub-
sequent conduct and an inconsistent statement:
Suppose the witness had testified, as he did, that when he examined
[the sidewalk] shortly after the accident he had found it in good
condition .... should it not then be admissible on cross-examina-
tion to ask him if he had not soon after that told a number of
persons that when he examined it, it was in very bad condition?' 1 4
The flaw in the court's reasoning is that it incorrectly interpreted the
village's subsequent repair of the sidewalk to mean only that the vil-
lage believed its sidewalk was in bad condition. The court neglected
to consider the possibility that the village did in fact believe that the
sidewalk was in good condition, but chose to exceed the standard of
care required in the maintenance of the sidewalk and make subse-
quent repairs. The village may have been taking an extra precaution
in excess of its duty of care, which the subsequent measure rule seeks
to encourage. Furthermore, the court's interpretation that the side-
walk had been in bad condition was taken to imply that the village
was negligent. The court did not permit evidence of subsequent meas-
ures for impeachment purposes, but rather to prove that the village
believed that it had been negligent. This is precisely the result that
the Rule seeks to prevent. Evidence of subsequent measures should
not be construed to be an admission of negligence." 5
The Supreme Court of Alabama followed the reasoning of Bond
Hill in Frierson v. Frazier."6 In Frierson, the plaintiff suffered the loss
of a team of mules that fell into a river because the defendant's ferry
lacked a rear guard rail to hold in the animals." 7 At trial, the defend-
ant testified that a rear guard rail on ferries was neither necessary nor
customary." 8 On cross-examination, the plaintiff's counsel intro-
duced evidence that a rear guard rail had subsequently been placed on
the ferry." 9 The Supreme Court of Alabama upheld the lower court's
decision to allow the admission of this evidence because it affected the
credibility of the testimony. 2 °
It is possible that the defendant may truly have believed that a
rear guard rail was neither necessary nor customary, and his subse-
113. Id. at 473-74.
114. Id. at 474.
115. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
116. 142 Ala. 232, 37 So. 825 (1904).
117. Id. at 234, 37 So. at 826.
118. Id. at 237, 37 So. at 827.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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quent installation. of the guard rail may have been simply an extra
precaution. It is precisely this taking of added precautions that the
rule seeks to encourage. 12" ' It can be argued, therefore, that the
defendant should have received the benefit of this assumption to fur-
ther the social policy concerns of the Rule, at least until the assump-
tion was shown to have been invalid in his case.
In cases with facts analogous to Frierson, not all state courts
admitted evidence of subsequent measures to impeach the credibility
of the defendant or his witness. For example, in Mitchell v. J. S. Scho-
field's Sons Co.,122 the plaintiff brought a wrongful death action
against a company for her son, who died in a scaffolding accident.1
23
An officer of Schofield's testified that the scaffolding was as strong as
those in general use, and that it was reasonably safe. 124 On cross-
examination, the plaintiff's counsel introduced evidence that the
defendant added braces to the scaffolding after the accident for addi-
tional support. 125 Affirming the trial court, the Georgia appellate
court held that this evidence was inadmissible. 126 The appellate court
reasoned that when a defendant seeks to introduce evidence of subse-
quent measures, the same considerations of public policy that act to
exclude evidence of subsequent measures in other circumstances
apply with equal force. Thus, subsequent measures evidence is not an
admission of negligence, and courts should encourage repairs by
refusing to admit evidence of subsequent measures-"whether such
evidence be offered in chief, or in rebuttal."'127
The Supreme Court of California reached a contrary result in
Inyo Chemical Co. v. City of Los Angeles. 121 In Inyo Chemical, the
court upheld the trial court's admission of evidence of subsequent
measures to impeach the credibility of a Los Angeles city employee
who had testified that a particular subsequent measure had not been
necessary. 29 Inyo Chemical was in the business of refining and sell-
ing trona, a mineral that it acquired from the bed of a lake adjoining
land leased from the city.' 3° During a hard rainfall, the aqueduct
operated by the city collapsed.' 3' The consequent flood waters
121. See supra note 2.
122. 19 Ga. App. 201, 91 S.E. 275 (1917).
123. Id. at 201, 91 S.E. at 276.
124. Id. at 202, 91 S.E. at 276.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. 5 Cal. 2d 525, 55 P.2d 850 (1936).
129. Id. at 543, 55 P.2d at 858-59.
130. Id. at 530, 55 P.2d at 852.
131. Id.
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washed out the company's trona beds and damaged its roads and
pipelines.' 32 The city called an employee who was charged with over-
seeing the maintenance and operation of the aqueduct as an expert
witness. The employee testified that he had inspected the area prior
to the aqueduct collapse and had concluded that no overhead or
underground drainage was necessary. 33 On cross-examination, coun-
sel for Inyo Chemical introduced evidence that the city had author-
ized the construction of longer spillways after the accident.'34 The
Supreme Court of California held that this evidence was admissible
"for the purpose of weakening the testimony of [the city's] expert wit-
ness by showing that he had subsequently changed his opinion as to
the necessity of drainage."'' 35
Five years later, the same court adhered to its holding in Inyo
Chemical when faced with a similar factual situation in the case of
Hatfield v. Levy Bros. 136 In Hatfield, a customer was injured when
she slipped on the floor in a clothing store. 37 An employee of the
store testified that he " 'looked at the floor (immediately after the
accident) and-did not notice anything unusual about the floor.' "138
Moreover, the defendant maintained at all times that nothing was
wrong with the floor.' 39 The plaintiff's counsel offered evidence that
after the accident, the defendant discontinued its practice of waxing
the store floor."4 The Supreme Court of California held that this evi-
dence was admissible because it "tended to impeach that [employee's]
testimony by showing that he had changed his mind with reference to
there being nothing wrong with the floor."' 4'
2. THE PERIOD FROM 1950 TO THE CODIFICATION OF THE
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE IN 1975
During the period from 1950 to the codification of the Federal
Rules of Evidence in 1975, courts and commentators uniformly
approved the use of subsequent measures evidence to impeach the
credibility of a witness as an established exception to the rule exclud-
ing evidence of subsequent measures to prove negligence. 142 This had
132. Id.
133. Id. at 543, 55 P.2d at 858.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 543, 55 P.2d at 859.
136. 18 Cal. 2d 798, 117 P.2d 841 (1941).
137. Id. at 803, 117 P.2d at 844.
138. Id. at 810, 117 P.2d at 847.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See infra notes 145-97 and accompanying text.
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not always been the case, however, and before approximately 1950,
legal commentators had virtually ignored the use of subsequent meas-
ures evidence for impeachment as a valid exception to the Rule. 143
Professor Wigmore did not recognize the use of subsequent measures
evidence to impeach the credibility of a witness by presenting contra-
dictory evidence until 1940; and then he relegated the recognition to a
footnote.'" By 1954, Professor McCormick had recognized what the
courts had held for years. 14  His treatise, published in that year,
acknowledged that evidence of subsequent measures could be admissi-
ble "as evidence contradicting facts testified to by the adversary's wit-
ness and thus impeaching [the witness'] credibility."' 146
Once scholars had accepted the impeachment exception, its
application became both more common and versatile. Plaintiff's law-
yers sought to expand the impeachment exception, and correspond-
ingly reduce the exclusionary effect of the rule against evidence of
subsequent measures.' 47 This expansion of the impeachment excep-
tion began in California, and decisions reached by California courts
had a significant effect on the exception's application following the
codification of Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975.148
The versatility of the impeachment exception was first exempli-
fied in Daggett v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway.149 In Dag-
gett, the plaintiff brought a wrongful death action against the railroad
after his two minor children were killed when the railroad's passenger
143. See, e.g., 1 B. ELLIOTT & W. ELLIOTr, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, § 150, at 205 (1904)
(The only exception to the rule is showing notice or control.); 1 S. GREENLEAF, THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE, § 195d, at 329 (J. Wigmore ed.) (16th ed. 1899) (Evidence of subsequent measures
is admissible solely for the admission that a person has or claims control over the place or
product.); I B. JONES, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, § 288, at 540 (4th ed. 1938) (The exceptions
to the rule against admission of evidence of subsequent measures are for proving that the
condition existed at the time of the accident, and for identifying who had the duty of repair.); 3
B. JONES, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, § 1043, at 1921-22 (2d ed. 1926) (Evidence of subsequent
measures is admissible to show the control of defendant, the condition of the place before and
after the accident, and in rebuttal when the defendant's evidence calls for such evidence.); 1 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, § 283, at 582-83 (2d ed. 1923) (The
three exceptions to the rule are showing control of the premises, condition of the place before
and after the accident, and failing to observe a precaution required by law.); 1 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, § 283, at 367 (1904) (same). But see 45 C.J. § 796,
at 1236 (1928) (Evidence of subsequent measures is admissible to rebut contentions or evidence
that no change had been made after the accident, and is admissible to show that no defect
existed.).
144. See 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, supra note 2, § 283, at
159 n.3.
145. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 31, at 544-45.
146. Id. at 545.
147. See infra notes 149-70 and accompanying text.
148. See infra notes 149-97 and accompanying text.
149. 48 Cal. 2d 655, 313 P.2d 557 (1957).
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train struck their automobile. 50 At trial, the plaintiff's counsel called
two witnesses for the defendant as adverse witnesses on direct exami-
nation pursuant to section 2055 of the California Code of Civil Proce-
dure.15 The first witness was the motorman who was driving the
train at the time of the accident.'52 The motorman testified that the
train was travelling at a speed of eighty-five to ninety miles per hour,
and that the speed limit in the district in which he was travelling "is
90 now."' 1 53 The plaintiff's counsel countered with evidence that the
speed limit in the district had been lowered after the accident to fifty
miles per hour.'54 The second witness called by the plaintiff's counsel
was a signal engineer for the railroad,' 55 who testified that the cross-
ing signal at the time of the accident was "'the safest type of sig-
nal.' "56 The plaintiff's counsel countered, once again, with evidence
that the former single wigwag signal had been changed after the acci-
dent to a double flashing-light signal.' 57
The Supreme Court of California addressed the issue of whether
it was proper for the plaintiff's counsel to call the witnesses for the
railroad on direct examination and then impeach them with evidence
of subsequent measures. 58 The court held that, generally under sec-
tion 2055 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, it was permissible
for the plaintiff's counsel to call the witnesses for the railroad on
direct examination and then impeach them.' 59 Because the witnesses
in such a situation were adverse, they could be subjected to impeach-
ment.' 6' Thus, the substantive interests of the rule excluding subse-
quent measures yielded to the procedural requisites of the interests of
litigation.
150. Id. at 658, 313 P.2d at 559.
151. Id. at 659, 313 P.2d at 559. Section 2055 of the California Code of Civil Procedure
provides in part:
A party to the record of any civil action or proceeding ... may be examined by
the adverse party as if under cross-examination, subject to the rules applicable to
the examination of other witnesses. The party calling such adverse witness shall
not be bound by his testimony, and the testimony given by such witness may be
rebutted by the party calling him for such examination by other evidence.
Id. at 659 n.2, 313 P.2d at 559 n.2. Section 2055 of the California Code of Civil Procedure was
repealed in 1965 and subsequently restated in substance as Evidence Code Section 776. CAL.
EvID. CODE § 776 (West 1966).
152. Daggett, 48 Cal. 2d at 659, 313 P.2d at 560.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 660, 313 P.2d at 560.
156. Id. (citing to the trial record).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 662, 313 P.2d at 561.
159. Id. at 664, 313 P.2d at 563.
160. Id.
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In addition, the court adopted a narrower focus when it consid-
ered whether the testimony of each of the two witnesses was, in fact,
subject to impeachment by evidence of subsequent measures.' 6' The
court held that the motorman's testimony as to the speed limit in the
district at the time of trial was subject to impeachment, because the
speed limit was fifty miles per hour and not ninety miles per hour as
the witness had testified.' 62 The court also held that the testimony of
the signal engineer on the safety of the single-light wigwag signal was
subject to impeachment " 'for the purpose of weakening the testimony
of defendant's expert witness by showing that he had subsequently
changed his opinion as to the . . .' safety of the conditions prevailing
at the time of the accident."' 163
The Daggett court's decision to permit evidence of subsequent
measures to impeach a defendant called as an adverse witness by the
plaintiff's counsel raises some concern about the potential for an
unbridled manipulation of the impeachment exception. The holding
in Daggett does not appear to prevent the plaintiff's counsel from call-
ing the defendant or his expert witness on direct examination, asking
the witness if he believed that the allegedly hazardous condition in
question was safe, and then impeaching the witness with evidence of
the defendant's subsequent measures."6 The plaintiff's counsel is
thus able to instigate the inconsistency in testimonies and manipulate
the impeachment exception to his own advantage. It is more com-
monly the defendant who opens the door to impeachment with incon-
sistent testimony.
A more subtle approach for the plaintiff's counsel would be to
engage the defendant, or the defendant's expert witness, in tedious
and confusing questioning, thereby increasing the likelihood that the
witness will testify inconsistently. The dissent in Daggett complained
of such a tactic. 165 After analyzing the questions and answers
exchanged by the plaintiff's counsel and the motorman as to the speed
limit in the district at the time of the trial, the dissent concluded that
the motorman had not testified inconsistently. 166 Rather, the dissent-
161. Id.
162. Id. at 664, 313 P.2d at 563.
163. Id. (citing Inyo Chem. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 5 Cal. 2d at 543, 55 P.2d at 859).
164. See Note, Exceptions to the Subsequent Remedial Conduct Rule, 18 HASTINGS L.J.
677, 679 (1967).
165. Daggett, 48 Cal. 2d. at 670, 313 P.2d at 567 (Schauer, Spence, and McComb, J.J.,
dissenting).
166. Id. The witness never testified that the speed limit for the street crossing remained at
90 miles per hour up to the time of trial. On the contrary, the witness testified that the overall
restriction for the district was 90 miles per hour, and acknowledged that lower restrictions
existed within the district. Id.
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ing judges concluded that the plaintiff's counsel swung back and forth
between the past and present tenses, without specifying which area of
the district he owas referring to, and that he succeeded in confusing
both the motorman and the court.167 Therefore, the dissent
concluded:
[A]ny confusion as to speeds, times, and district or areas appears
from the record to have been invited and brought about by the
counsel for plaintiffs, who then seized upon such alleged confusion
as an excuse to get before the jury otherwise inadmissible evidence
of a change in the speed limit after the accident.16
The potential that Daggett may be used by plaintiff's counsels to
foster manipulation is disturbing because it was a major departure
from the three original scenarios that gave rise to the admission of
evidence of subsequent measures to impeach in the earlier common
law cases. This departure threatens to compromise the integrity of
the impeachment exception and the social interests sought to be pro-
moted by the rule excluding evidence of subsequent measures.
In every case prior to Daggett that involved the use of subsequent
measures evidence to impeach, the defendant was called on direct
examination by his own counsel, and then proceeded to testify incon-
sistently or in a false and misleading manner. 69 The defendant was
the initiator of the contradiction and was deemed the aggressor, while
the plaintiff was the victim of the false testimony. In these instances,
the courts felt the need to protect the plaintiff's position by admitting
contradictory evidence of subsequent measures to impeach the credi-
bility of the defendant, or his witness. The result was that the defend-
ant was severely hindered in his attempt to gain an unfair advantage
over the plaintiff in litigation by manipulating the exclusionary nature
of the subsequent measures rule.
In Daggett, however, the plaintiff was viewed as the aggressor,
and the defendant as the victim. Because the courts had formerly
acted to protect the plaintiff from the defendant's unbridled manipu-
lation of the evidence, the dissent found it difficult to justify protect-
ing a plaintiff who had actively initiated the inconsistent testimony. If
the plaintiff had refrained from asking the defendant whether he
believed the allegedly hazardous condition was safe, he could have
avoided the controversy altogether.
Sensing that the application of the impeachment exception had
expanded beyond its proper limits, and that it now threatened to cir-
167. Id.
168. Id. at 667, 313 P.2d at 565.
169. See supra notes 37-141 and accompanying text.
19881
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
cumvent the rule excluding evidence of subsequent measures, the Cal-
ifornia District Court of Appeal sought to restrict the application of
the exception in Pierce v. J. C. Penney Co. 7° In Pierce, the plaintiff
was injured after falling down the terrazo stairs in a department
store. 7 ' At trial, the department store called the section manager of
the store as its witness.1 72 The manager had gone to the scene imme-
diately after the accident and had inspected the steps, and testified
that "there was no foreign substance on the steps and that they were
not slippery. "173 On cross-examination, the plaintiff's counsel sought
to impeach the witness with evidence that the defendant added abra-
sive strips to the stairs after the accident. 74
The Pierce court considered the admissibility of evidence of sub-
sequent measures for impeachment according to the following two
methods. The first method concerned "[i]mpeachment by evidence of
previous conduct inconsistent with the fact or belief asserted by the
witness on the stand."' 75 The court recognized that prior California
cases authorized the admission of subsequent measures evidence to
impeach a witness who had authorized or directed changes to the
allegedly hazardous condition after the accident, and had then testi-
fied at trial that he believed the condition to have been safe prior to
the accident. 76 The court, however, distinguished these cases from
the instant case by holding that subsequent measures evidence was
not admissible to impeach a nonexpert witness who had not author-
ized, recommended, directed, approved, or supervised the subsequent
changes.' 77 The Pierce court reasoned that there had been no evi-
dence of conduct inconsistent with the witness' testimony, because he
had had no involvement with the subsequent repairs. 178
The second method analyzed by the court concerned
"[i]mpeachment by contradictory evidence.' ' 79 The plaintiff, by this
method, would seek to introduce subsequent measures evidence on
the ground that these acts, although not implemented or authorized
by the witness, contradicted the witness' belief that the condition
prior to the accident had been safe. The Pierce court stated that for it
to view the subsequent placing of abrasive strips in the case at hand as
170. 167 Cal. App. 2d 3, 334 P.2d 117 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
171. Id. at 4, 334 P.2d at 118.
172. Id. at 5, 334 P.2d at 119.
173. Id. at 6, 334 P.2d at 119.
174. Id. at 5, 334 P.2d at 119.
175. Id. at 8, 334 P.2d at 120-21 (emphasis omitted).
176. Id. at 8, 334 P.2d at 121.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 9, 334 P.2d at 121 (emphasis omitted).
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contradictory to the witness' testimony, it would have to "accept the
premise that proof of this fact constitute[d] competent evidence tend-
ing to prove that before the abrasive strips were applied, the steps
[had been] ... unsafe."' 80 It reasoned further that such a premise was
not acceptable because "evidence of subsequent precautions is not
competent to prove lack of safety in the antecedent condition.' 81
Moreover, the Pierce court, noting that admission of the evidence
relating to the placing of abrasive strips on the steps could lead to a
complete circumvention of the rule excluding evidence of subsequent
measures, stated:
[T]o affirm the admissibility of the evidence of subsequent changes
and precautions to impeach (contradict) testimony of the character
given by the witness . .. would . . .completely . . .nullify the
general rule and reduce it to nothing more than an empty shell....
[Thus] whenever a defendant in this type of case call[ed] any wit-
ness to testify to any observation tending to prove the safety of, or
lack of danger or defectiveness in, his premises at the time of an
accident, the door is automatically opened to plaintiff to prove (by
way of impeachment) every subsequent repair made or precaution
taken.' 82
In addition, the court distinguished its holding from the Daggett
decision. 83 In Daggett, the second witness impeached by the plain-
tiff's counsel had neither authorized, nor directed the placing of an
improved wigwag signal subsequent to the occurrence of the accident.
Rather, the witness testified that the improved wigwag signal was
"'the safest type of signal.' "184 In analyzing the Daggett decision, the
Pierce court stated that the witness in Daggett testified as an expert,' 85
whereas the witness in Pierce testified as a layman'. 86 Furthermore,
the court concluded that because the witness in Daggett had voiced "a
rather extravagant opinion" about the signal, he was subject to
impeachment 87 under circumstances very different from those in the
instant case.'88 Finally, although the Pierce court placed limitations
on the application of the impeachment exception, it upheld the prac-
tice whereby a plaintiff calls a defendant or his expert witness to tes-
180. Id. at 10, 334 P.2d at 122.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 11, 334 P.2d at 122.
183. Id. at 12, 334 P.2d at 123.
184. Daggett v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 48 Cal. 2d 655, 660, 313 P.2d 557, 560
(1957) (citing to the trial record).
185. Pierce, 167 Cal. App. 2d at 12, 334 P.2d at 123.
186. Id. at 6, 334 P.2d at 119.
187. Id. at 12, 334 P.2d at 123.
188. Id. at 13, 334 P.2d at 124.
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tify on direct examination, and then impeaches the witness with
evidence of subsequent measures. 19
Therefore, a witness who authorized, or directed a change to an
allegedly hazardous condition after the occurrence of an accident and
then testified that the condition before the accident had been safe,
would be subject to impeachment through the introduction of evi-
dence that subsequent measures had been implemented; evidence of
the subsequent measures would show that his testimony was inconsis-
tent with his conduct. On the other hand, a witness who had not
authorized or directed the change to an allegedly hazardous condition
after an accident, but who testified that the condition before the acci-
dent had been safe, would not be subject to impeachment because his
testimony was not inconsistent with his conduct. The latter witness,
however, would be subject to impeachment if he testified as an expert
that the condition in question was the "best," or the "safest." Finally,
a witness who testified in a false or misleading manner about the
safety of the allegedly hazardous condition was subject to impeach-
ment with evidence of subsequent measures.
The fifteen years prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of
Evidence witnessed no further qualification of the impeachment
exception to the subsequent measures rule. Rather, the courts applied
the impeachment exception within the parameters defined by one
state court.1 90 These boundaries, however, were tested in Sanchez v.
Bagues & Sons Mortuaries. 9' In Sanchez, the plaintiff, while walking
through the defendant's mortuary, was injured when she slipped on a
step that allegedly had a worn and slippery strip of abrasive tape. 192
The plaintiff's counsel called the defendant as an adverse witness on
direct examination and asked him: "You don't think these steps were
slippery on [the date of the accident], do you?"' 93 The plaintiff's
counsel then sought to impeach the witness with evidence that the
abrasive strip had been replaced after the accident.' 94 Outside the
hearing of the jury, the plaintiff's counsel explained to the court:
189. Id. at 11, 334 P.2d at 122.
190. See, e.g., American Airlines v. United States, 418 F.2d 180, 196 (5th Cir. 1969)
(Evidence that the face of a drum-type altimeter was altered after a plane crash was admissible
to impeach testimony by the airline's director of flight operations that the altimeter used before
the accident was safe and that there was no reason to change it.); Slow Development Co. v.
Coulter, 88 Ariz. 122, 353 P.2d 890 (1960) (Evidence that abrasive strips were placed on a
cement walk after an accident was admissible to impeach testimony by a hotel expert that the
cement was not slippery and that it was in the same condition after the accident as before.).
191. 271 Cal. App. 2d 188, 76 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1969).
192. Id. at 190, 76 Cal.' Rptr. 372.
193. Id. at 191, 76 Cal. Rptr. 372.
194. Id.
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"The only reason I asked the defendant whether or not in his opinion
the condition was safe at the time of the accident is that now I can
bring in the pictures to impeach his testimony."195
The court held that the above question did not lay a sufficient
foundation for the impeaching evidence and it criticized the attempt
to introduce evidence of subsequent measures as a "deliberate and cal-
culated attempt to circumvent the exclusionary rule and the policy
which prompted its establishment." 196 Following the reasoning of
Pierce, the court held that no evidence had been offered to show that
the defendant had ordered the replacement of the strip, and that he
was therefore not subject to impeachment with the subsequent
replacement when he testified that the step was safe.197
III. THE STATE OF THE IMPEACHMENT EXCEPTION SUBSEQUENT
TO THE ENACTMENT OF RULE 407 OF THE FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE
The comnon law rule excluding evidence of subsequent meas-
ures was codified in Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.' 98
Unlike the previous state evidentiary rules that adopted the common
law rule excluding evidence of subsequent measures,' 99 Rule 407 pro-
vides that evidence of subsequent measures is admissible for the pur-
pose of impeachment. 200 Thus, the common law rule of impeaching a
witness with evidence of subsequent measures was now to be uni-
formly applied by the federal courts.
Since the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
impeachment exception has been developed further by the federal
courts, which have interpreted Rule 407 in light of prior case law
which considered the admissibility of evidence of subsequent remedial
measures. Although some commentators have speculated that the
development of the impeachment exception over the years may
adversely affect the purpose of the subsequent measures rule, thereby
thwarting the rule's purpose of encouraging remedial repairs or
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 192, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
198. See supra note 1, and accompanying text.
199. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1151 (West 1966); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-451 (1983); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A, Rule 51 (West 1976). These statutes provide: "When, after the
occurrence of an event, remedial or precautionary measures are taken, which, if taken
previously, would have tended to make the event less likely to occur, evidence of such
subsequent measures is inadmissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection
with the event." Id. There are slight punctuation differences among the three statutes. See id.
200. See supra note 4.
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improvements,2° ' the methods for impeaching a witness with evidence
of subsequent measures developed at common law continue to be
practiced in the federal courts.
A. Impeaching a Witness Who Makes False or Misleading
Assertions Regarding the Safety of the Allegedly
Hazardous Condition
The use of evidence of subsequent measures to impeach a witness
who makes false or misleading assertions is almost universally
accepted by the federal courts. The use of the impeachment exception
for this purpose is most important because it prevents witnesses for
the defendant from testifying in a manner that would circumvent the
interest of maintaining fairness and promoting truth among the par-
ties to litigation.20 2 Thus, a defendant might be tempted to achieve an
unfair advantage over the plaintiff by introducing false testimony,
expecting the exclusionary nature of the Rule to act as a shield.2 °3
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit faced
such a situation in Patrick v. South Central Bell Telephone Co.2" The
plaintiff was a lineman for a power company who had been dispatched
in an aerial lift truck during a storm to check damage to a power
line. 2 5 As the truck proceeded down a street, the aerial lift bucket on
the truck struck a telephone cable, which was hanging four feet below
its prestorm height.20 6 As a result, the truck acquired a charge of
201. See Bickerstaff v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 676 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1982). In
Bickerstaff, the Fifth Circuit noted the negative attributes of the impeachment exception:
The leading authorities ... have pointed out the difficulties with regard to the
'impeachment' exception. . . . [I]n connection with the other rules, the
impeachment 'exception' may swallow up the 'rule' insofar as utilized on cross-
examination of an adverse witness .... Professor Moore merely notes that the
trial judge should guard against the improper admission of such evidence 'to
prove prior negligence under the guise of impeachment.'
Id. at 168; see also 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 407[05], at 407-
33 (1986) ("Care should be taken that needless inquiry and concern over credibilty does not
result in unnecessarily undercutting the policy objective of the basic exclusionary rule."); C.
WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 4, § 5289, at 145-47 ("It is possible that the Advisory
Committee intended that the impeachment exception should be used to undermine Rule 407
.... If not, . . . the trial judge [has] very little power to prevent this result.").
202. Rule 102 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states: "These rules shall be construed to
secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and
promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be
ascertained and proceedings justly determined." FED. R. EvID. 102.
203. D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 23, at 396 (The "impeachment exception is
needed when defendant attempts unfairly to exploit the exclusionary doctrine by testimony
which would mislead if subsequent measures are excluded.").
204. 641 F.2d 1192 (6th Cir. 1980).
205. Id. at 1194.
206. Id.
[Vol. 42:901
IMPEACHMENT EXCEPTION TO RULE 407
electricity, and the plaintiff was electrocuted when he attempted to
leave the truck at a subsequent stop.20 7 At the time of the accident,
Tennessee law required that all power lines be maintained at a mini-
mum height of eighteen feet.20 8 At trial, an expert witness for the
telephone company testified that after the accident the cable was
raised to twenty-one feet seven inches, its prestorm height.2°9 Counsel
for the plaintiff's estate introduced evidence that the cable was raised
to twenty-one feet seven inches by raising the point at which it was
attached to the preexisting poles and by adding a new pole between
the two preexisting poles. 210 Thus, the impeaching evidence implied
that without the subsequent measure, the true prestorm height of the
power line was thirteen feet ten inches. 21' The Sixth Circuit held that
evidence of the subsequent repair was admissible for the purpose of
impeaching the witness for the telephone company, who had implied
that the cable's original height was above the statutory minimum
height, when it had actually been well below the statutory
minimum. 21 2
The Patrick case illustrates the necessity for permitting impeach-
ment with evidence of subsequent measures. A contrary holding
would have unduly disadvantaged the plaintiff by not allowing the
false assertions made by the telephone company's witness to be
impeached with contradictory evidence of the subsequent measure.
Consequently, any false or misleading statements made by the defend-
ant, or his witness, should be subject to impeachment with evidence of
subsequent measures taken by the defendant.
B. Impeaching a Witness Who Testifies That the Allegedly
Hazardous Condition Was Safe
In Pierce, the California District Court of Appeal limited the
common law rule that allowed the use of subsequent measures evi-
dence to impeach a defendant, or his witness, who testified that an
allegedly hazardous condition had been safe prior to the accident. 2 3
The Pierce court restricted the availability of the impeachment excep-
tion to witnesses who had control over, or the authority to implement,
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1194 n.1.
209. Id. at 1195.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1197.
213. See supra Section II(B)(1)(c).
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214the subsequent measure,' who were expert witnesses,215 or who had
made "extravagant" assertions about the safety of the condition in
216question.2
In applying Rule 407, however, the federal courts have only par-
tially applied the Pierce rule.217 For example, a witness who merely
testifies that an allegedly hazardous condition was safe prior to the
accident is not subject to impeachment.218 On the other hand, a wit-
ness who testifies that the condition before the accident was the "saf-
est" possible, or the "best in the world," or that "all reasonable care
was used," is subject to impeachment.219 The federal courts, however,
have failed to apply the other limitations on the admissibility of evi-
dence of subsequent measures made by the Pierce court. 220 The dis-
tinction between one who has control or authority to implement the
subsequent measure and one who does not, and the distinction
between an expert and a nonexpert have both not been recognized by
the federal courts.22'
In Kenny v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Author-
ity, 222 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held
that evidence of subsequent measures is admissible to impeach a wit-
ness who testified that all reasonable care had been used in making the
condition safe. 223 The plaintiff in Kenny was waiting on a metro train
platform when she was beaten and raped by an assailant, who dragged
her to a dark end of the platform.224 The victim sued the transporta-
tion authority for negligence in failing to properly illuminate the plat-
form.225  At trial, a witness for the authority testified that all
reasonable care had been used in checking the lighting fixtures226 and
that some bulbs had been replaced. 227 On cross-examination, the
plaintiff's counsel introduced evidence that a new fluorescent fixture
was installed four days after the attack.228
The Third Circuit explained that "when the defendant opens up
214. Pierce, 167 Cal. App. 2d at 8, 334 P.2d at 121.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. See infra notes 222-59 and accompanying text.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. 581 F.2d 351 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1073 (1979).
223. Id. at 356.
224. Id. at 353.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 356.
227. Id. at 355.
228. Id.
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the issue by claiming that all reasonable care was being exercised...
the plaintiff may attack that contention by showing later repairs
which are inconsistent with it."' 229 The court reasoned that the "testi-
mony bore directly on the inference that since the lighting was
checked on a daily basis, it was adequate at the time the incident
occurred. 230
The court's emphasis on the testimony of the authority's witness
that all reasonable care was exercised suggests that a distinction may
be made between testimony that all reasonable care was exercised and
testimony that only reasonable care was exercised. A witness testify-
ing to the latter contention is merely stating his belief that the defend-
ant exercised due care, although it may have been possible to have
exercised a higher degree of care. A subsequent measure taken by a
defendant implementing a higher degree of care in such a situation
would not be inconsistent with his belief that he had not acted negli-
gently prior to the accident.
A witness testifying, on the other hand, that all reasonable care
was exercised prior to the accident implies that no better care was
possible and that the care exercised was the safest and highest possi-
ble. Evidence of subsequent measures would clearly be inconsistent
with this contention. It is this extravagant description of the defend-
ant's exercise of care that is afforded no protection from impeachment
by evidence of subsequent measures because the defendant testified
beyond what is necessary for his defense.
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
directly confronted this issue in Wolf By Wolf v. Proctor & Gamble
Co.2 3I The plaintiff brought an action on behalf of her daughter, who
had allegedly contracted toxic shock syndrome from using Rely
tampons.232 Subsequent to the incident, Proctor & Gamble volunta-
rily withdrew Rely tampons from the market.233 At trial, the defend-
ant maintained that Rely tampons were safe.234 Counsel for the
plaintiff argued that the withdrawal of Rely tampons by the defendant
should be admissible to impeach the defendant's contention that the
tampons were safe.235 The evidence of the subsequent withdrawal of
Rely tampons was not admissible for impeachment purposes. The
district court stated: "To allow evidence of defendant's withdrawal
229. Id. at 356.
230. Id.
231. 555 F. Supp. 613 (D.N.J. 1982).
232. Id. at 616.
233. Id. at 623.
234. Id. at 624.
235. Id.
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from the market of Rely in order to prove product defect or causation
would certainly thwart the policy" of encouraging remedial meas-
ures. 2 36 The court further reasoned that Rule 407 is designed to avoid
giving rise to "inferences of product defect and of defendants'
negligence. "237
In Probus v. K-Mart, Inc. ,238 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit similarly held that evidence of subsequent
measures was not admissible to impeach a witness who testified on
behalf of the defendant that the condition in question had been safe,
rather than testifying that the condition in question was the safest. In
Probus, the plaintiff sued for a back injury he had suffered allegedly
from a fall from a ladder sold by K-Mart. 239 At trial, an expert for K-
Mart testified that the quality of the plastic used in the endcaps of the
ladder was appropriate. 2' To rebut this testimony, the plaintiff's
counsel proffered evidence that K-Mart replaced the material used in
the ladder endcaps, and strengthened the caps with glass fiber rein-
forcement after the accident.24 1
In affirming the trial court's refusal to admit the evidence of the
subsequent measure for impeachment purposes,2 4 2 the Seventh Circuit
stated that although evidence of subsequent measures can be intro-
duced to contradict a witness who claims that he exercised due care
or that the materials used were appropriate, "allowing that and no
more to satisfy the impeachment exception would elevate it to the
rule. '243 The court noted that "the plaintiff [did] not contend that the
defendants testified that the material used in the endcap was ... the
best material available." 2" Thus, the court implied that the defend-
ant's witness would had to have made an exaggerated claim about the
appropriateness of the endcap material in order to permit the plain-
tiff's counsel to impeach the expert witness with evidence of the sub-
sequent measures. Furthermore, the only plausible inference from the
evidence of the subsequent measures in the instant case was that at
the time of the accident, K-Mart believed that its ladder was unsafe-
precisely the inference that Rule 407 seeks to preclude.
The distinction that the federal courts make between testimony
236. Id.
237. Id,
238. 794 F.2d 1207 (7th Cir. 1986).
239. Id. at 1208.
240. Id. at 1209.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 1210.
243. Id.
244. Id.
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that claims the condition before the accidentwas "safe" and testi-
mony that claims that the condition was the "safest"-extravagant
testimony-was further demonstrated in Muzyka v. Remington
Arms.245 In Muzyka, evidence of subsequent measures was admitted
to impeach a witness who testified extravagantly about the safety of a
product in question. 246 The plaintiff was shot as her stepfather
unloaded a magazine-fed, bolt-action rifle manufactured by the
defendant.247 In order to unload the ammunition from the rifle, it was
necessary to release the rifle's safety mechanism, and thereby place
the rifle in the "fire" position.248 At trial, Remington called an expert
witness who testified that the Remington rifle was rated a 9.8 or 9.9
on a safety scale of 10 and that no other model was superior to this
rifle.249 Furthermore, in his opening and closing statements, Reming-
ton's counsel stated that the rifle "is the best rifle and the safety is the
safest safety, it is the safest bolt-action rifle."' 250 The district court
refused to admit evidence that Remington had changed the design of
its safety mechanism after the accident. 251 After the jury returned a
verdict in favor of the defendant,252 the trial judge, in ruling on the
plaintiff's motion for a new trial, indicated that he should have per-
mitted the plaintiff's counsel to impeach the defendant's expert wit-
ness with evidence of the subsequent measure. The court, however,
considered this error harmless. 3
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
reversed, holding that the district court should have permitted the
plaintiff's counsel to impeach the defendant's witness with evidence
that the defendant had changed the model and safety mechanism after
the accident and that, therefore, the error was not harmless.254 The
appellate court based its decision upon the aggressive comments made
by Remington's counsel and expert witness. 255 By exaggerating the
condition of its product, the defendant overstepped the boundaries of
protection afforded by the exclusionary aspect of Rule'407. A defend-
ant who testifies that his place or product was safe, merely states an
opinion that is necessary and expected for his defense. A defendant,
245. 774 F.2d 1309 (5th Cir. 1985).
246. Id. at 1313.
247. Id. at 1310.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 1312.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 1313.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
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however, who calls his product the "safest" or the "best," goes
beyond what is necessary and becomes an aggressor. The impeach-
ment exception is designed to keep in check such aggressive attempts
to manipulate the exclusionary nature of the Rule excluding evidence
of subsequent measures. Otherwise, a defendant who testifies extrava-
gantly about the safety of his place or product would certainly have
an undue advantage at trial over the plaintiff.
As previously noted, the court in Pierce distinguished one who
controlled or supervised the making of the subsequent repair from one
who did not.2 56 The Pierce court also made a similar distinction
between one who was an expert, and one who was not.2"7 The federal
courts, however, have ignored these distinctions.2"' It can be argued
that the federal cases distinguishing between testimony that describes
a condition as "safe" and testimony that terms a condition the "saf-
est" are consistent with Pierce because all witnesses in the federal
cases previously discussed were experts and had no control or super-
vision over the subsequent measure. It would, nevertheless, most
likely be incorrect to say that a witness in federal court who had
implemented or supervised the subsequent measure, or who was an
expert, would be subject to impeachment for testifying that the condi-
tion in question was safe, as opposed to asserting an "extravagant"
claim.
This view is supported by two considerations. First, because the
federal cases make no mention of the distinctions raised by Pierce,
they are not relevant in the federal courts. Second, control or supervi-
sion over the implementation of the subsequent measure, or whether
the witness who testified was an expert, is irrelevant in distinguishing
between "safe" and "safest." A witness who testifies that the alleg-
edly hazardous condition was safe is still only testifying concerning
what is necessary for the defendant's defense. Therefore, the witness
should be protected by the Rule against the admission of subsequent
measures evidence, whether he had control or supervision over the
subsequent measure, or whether he was an expert. Furthermore, the
inference that flows from evidence of subsequent measures-that the
allegedly hazardous condition was unsafe-is highly prejudicial to the
defendant. Moreover, a witness who testifies extravagantly is the
aggressor and has gone beyond what is necessary to assert the defend-
ant's defense. He is accordingly subject to impeachment regardless of
these distinctions. Therefore, it is plausible to conclude that these
256. Pierce, 167 Cal. App. 2d at 5, 334 P.2d at 119.
257. Id. at 12, 334 P.2d at 123.
258. See supra notes 204-55 and accompanying text.
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considerations that underlie Pierce were unduly emphasized by the
court in order to distinguish a contrary and controlling higher court
holding for the purpose of achieving a proper result.
One Fifth Circuit case, however, allowed a witness who testified
that the condition in question had been safe to be impeached with
evidence of a subsequent written warning. In Dollar v. Long Manu-
facturing, NC.,259 the plaintiff's son was crushed to death between
the control panel of the backhoe he had been operating and the
rollbar canopy of the tractor.26° The plaintiff claimed that the back-
hoe had been negligently designed and manufactured because there
was no adequate restraint to prevent the uplift of the backhoe from
causing the operator to be crushed against the rollbar.26' At trial, an
expert for the manufacturer testified that it was his opinion that the
backhoe was safe to operate while affixed to a rollbar-equipped trac-
tor.262 Counsel for the plaintiff sought to impeach the witness with a
warning bulletin that the witness himself sent to all of the manufac-
turer's backhoe dealers after the accident. 263 The warning stated: "It
has been determined that a backhoe operator can be crushed to death
against the rollbar or safety cab where the backhoe is not rigidly
mounted. ' ' 21 The trial court refused to allow impeachment by the
admission of this evidence. 265 The Fifth Circuit reversed and held
that in the face of the witness' testimony "as to his present opinion of
the safety of the backhoe when attached to a rollbar-equipped tractor,
[the court did] not think unfair prejudice to the defendant would have
resulted from his having been confronted by his own letter warning of
exposure to death by such use." 266
The Dollar decision can be distinguished from the previous cases
in which the witness testified that the condition in question had been
safe. In the other federal cases, the subsequent measure was conduct
that concerned a particular condition. In Dollar, the subsequent mea-
sure was an inconsistent written statement made by the witness. 267
The Dollar court focused on the inconsistency between the expert's
testimony in court and the warning he issued after the accident,
rather than on any subsequent conduct that was inconsistent.268
259. 561 F.2d 613 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978).
260. Id. at 615.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 618.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. See supra notes 262-64 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 262-64 and accompanying text.
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Because the issuing of a subsequent warning is subsequent conduct, it
should be treated as any other subsequent measure. Evidence of sub-
sequent measures, however, would be admissible to impeach extrava-
gant testimony by the defendant or his witness. Thus, the Fifth
Circuit should not have admitted evidence of the subsequent warning
to impeach the defendant's witness, who testified only that the alleg-
edly hazardous condition was, in fact, safe.
The distinction made by the federal courts between a defendant,
or his witness, who testifies that an allegedly hazardous condition was
"safe," and one who testifies that the allegedly hazardous condition
was the "safest," the "best," or that "all reasonable care" had been
exercised is proper because it prevents the introduction of evidence
unfairly prejudicial to a defendant. Moreover, defendants who
attempt to manipulate the subsequent measures Rule are denied an
unfair advantage.
C. Impeaching an Adverse Witness Called on Direct Examination
by the Plaintiffs Counsel
The practice of a plaintiff's counsel of calling, as an adverse wit-
ness, a defendant, or his witness, on direct examination, and then
impeaching the witness with evidence of subsequent measures is rec-
ognized by the federal courts. Accordingly, there is a danger that the
plaintiff will circumvent the purpose of the subsequent measures Rule
by using manipulative tactics.
The Fifth Circuit confronted such a situation in Bickerstaff v.
South Central Bell Telephone Co.269 The plaintiff had been injured
while speaking on the telephone in her home during an electrical
storm.27° She claimed that the telephone company had been negligent
in failing to warn her of the possible dangers of electrical shock when
using the telephone during a thunderstorm. 27' At trial, the plaintiff's
counsel called a telephone company supervisor as an adverse wit-
ness. 272 The supervisor testified that a " 'warning' " was a strong
statement that implied an "impending danger, requiring a drastic
change in behavior." '273 Therefore, it was "not advisable or appropri-
ate where the risks were minimal" to issue such a warning.274 The
plaintiff's counsel then sought to impeach the supervisor with evi-
dence of a subsequent warning given by the telephone company to its
269. 676 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1982).
270. Id. at 164.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 167.
273. Id.
274. Id.
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subscribers stating that a slight risk of electrical shock existed if the
telephone was used during an electrical storm.2" The district court
refused to admit this evidence.276
The Fifth Circuit ruled that the district court's refusal to admit
the evidence of the warning-a subsequent measure-was harmless
error. 277 Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit thought that the district court
should have allowed the telephone company supervisor to be
impeached,2 78 even though it cited one commentator who had
expressed reservations about plaintiffs calling a witness for the defend-
ant as an adverse witness, and then impeaching that witness with evi-
dence of subsequent measures.279
The Bickerstaff opinion notes that it is inevitable that plaintiffs
will use such a tactic. Professors Wright and Graham agree:
[I]t is doubtful that the plaintiff, at common law, could have called
the defendant to the stand, asked him if he thought he had been
negligent, and impeached him with evidence of subsequent repairs
if he answered 'no.' But after the Advisory Committee provided
that a party can impeach his own witness, that a witness can
express an opinion on the ultimate issue, and that prior inconsis-
tent statements can be used as substantive evidence, it is difficult to
see what is to prevent this.2 81
Professor Weinstein suggests that the trial judge should apply Rules
401281 and 403282 before admitting evidence for the purpose of
impeaching an adverse witness.283 Professors Wright and Graham,
however, argue that Rules 401 and 403 would not prevent the admis-
sion of such evidence:
Negligence or culpability is usually an ultimate issue in the case so
that questions going to that issue are clearly relevant. If the
defendant or his witnesses are competent to testify on that issue, it
is difficult to see how the probative worth of their testimony could
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 169.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 168.
280. C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 4, § 5289, at 145 (footnotes omitted).
281. Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states: "'Relevant evidence' means
evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence." FED. R. EvID. 401.
282. Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states: "Although relevant, evidence may
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EvID. 403.
283. WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 201, § 407[05], at 407-34.
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be so low as to be excluded under Rule 403.284
Professors Wright and Graham have implicitly challenged com-
mentators to provide advice on ways of preventing this potential
manipulation.285 Two remedies are available to ameliorate this prob-
lem. First, evidence of subsequent measures should not be admissible
to impeach a defendant, or his witness, who has been called as an
adverse witness by the plaintiff.286 This approach would be an excep-
tion to Rule 607, which allows a party to impeach his own witness.287
In order to encourage the implementation of remedial measures, the
ability of the plaintiff's counsel to manipulate Rule 407 should, there-
fore, be restricted. Although this remedy would appear to be drastic,
it is consistent with the earlier common law application of the
impeachment exception whereby the defendant would be called to the
stand by his own counsel, and then would initiate the dispute by testi-
fying in a false or misleading manner about the safety of an allegedly
hazardous condition.288 Under common law prior to approximately
1950, impeachment through the admission of contradictory evidence
was used defensively to protect a plaintiff from an aggressive defend-
ant attempting to manipulate the exclusionary nature of the rule for
his own advantage.289 It is not logical, however, to offer similar pro-
tection to a plaintiff who is on the offensive. In such a situation, the
defendant is in greater need of protection than the plaintiff who is
seeking to prove the defendant's negligence under the guise of
impeachment.29 °
Second, evidence of subsequent measures should be admissible to
impeach a defendant, or his witness, who is called as an adverse wit-
ness only when the defendant truly initiates the inconsistency. The
trial judge should ensure strict compliance with this condition. To
accomplish this objective, the defendant should not be subject to
impeachment with evidence of subsequent measures when he answers
either of two dangerously manipulative questions asked by the plain-
284. C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 4, § 5289, at 146 (footnotes omitted); see M.
GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FLORIDA EVIDENCE § 407.1, at 255 n. 11 (1987) ("Rule [403] would
permit exclusion .... However, given the critical nature of the inquiry it is not surprising that
most decisions permit impeachment even though the exception swallows up the rule.").
285. C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 4, § 5289, at 145.
286. See Note, supra note 164, at 683 ("The most effective way to eliminate the dangers
inherent in the impeachment exception would be to disallow the admission of evidence of
subsequent remedial conduct to impeach a witness called by the plaintiff.").
287. Rule 607 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states: "The credibility of a witness may be
attacked by any party, including the party calling the witness." FED. R. EVID. 607.
288. See supra Section II(B)(1).
289. See supra Section II(B).
290. See J. MOORE, supra note 5, at IV-159.
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tiff. The two questions are, "Do you think that the allegedly hazard-
ous condition was safe?" and "Would it not be safer to perform the
measures you subsequently undertook?" It is important to note that
these questions are equally dangerous when asked on cross-examina-
tion by the plaintiff. It is, therefore, proposed that these questions not
subject the defendant, or his witness, to impeachment with evidence
of subsequent measures, regardless of whether they are asked on
cross-examination or on direct examination of the defendant or his
witness as an adverse witness.
An affirmative response to the first question-"Do you think that
the allegedly hazardous condition was safe?"-should not subject the
defendant or his witness to impeachment with evidence of subsequent
measures for the same reason that a defendant who testifies that the
allegedly hazardous condition was safe is not subject to impeachment.
The inference received from the impeaching subsequent measures evi-
dence is that defendant's conduct was not safe, and was thus negli-
gent. This inference is precisely the inference the Rule seeks to
exclude. A defendant or his witness, called as an adverse witness by
the plaintiff, who asserts that the allegedly hazardous condition was
safe in response to a plaintiff's question is no different from a defend-
ant, or his witness, who asserts that the allegedly hazardous condition
was safe on direct examination by his own counsel. In both of these
situations, the defendant or his witness should be protected from the
possibility of impeachment by evidence of subsequent measures.
A negative response to the second question-"Would it not be
safer to perform the measures you subsequently undertook?"-
appears to warrant impeachment because of the inconsistency
between the witness' belief and his subsequent conduct. The focus,
however, should be on the inference derived from the question and
the purpose for asking the question. The inference derived from the
subsequent measures evidence to impeach in this situation is that the
defendant's care for the allegedly hazardous condition was not as safe
as it should have been, and therefore the defendant was negligent.
The fact that this inference may be drawn defeats the premise behind
Rule 407-the fact a defendant makes an allegedly hazardous condi-
tion safer should not be taken as proof of prior negligence. In asking
this question, the plaintiff acts as an aggressor who seeks to offer evi-
dence of subsequent measures after setting the stage for the inconsis-
tent evidence. Such conduct should not be tolerated because it would
encourage plaintiffs' counsels to manipulate the examination process
in order to create inconsistencies and bring in otherwise inadmissible
evidence of subsequent measures.
19881
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:901
Thus, in responding to either of these questions, whether on
cross-examination or direct examination, an adverse witness should
not be subject to impeachment with evidence of subsequent measures.
The impeachment exception was created as a shield to protect a
defenseless plaintiff from an aggressive defendant. It was not
designed to be used as a sword by an aggressive plaintiff to coerce a
defendant into giving seemingly inconsistent testimony in order to
impeach him with evidence of subsequent measures.
IV. THE USE OF IMPEACHMENT UNDER OTHER RULES THAT
EXCLUDE EVIDENCE AS A MATTER OF PUBLIC POLICY
Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence29 ' excludes evidence
of compromise or offers to compromise made during the course of
settlement negotiations to prove liability for, or the invalidity of, a
party's claim.292 The public policy for excluding such evidence is to
promote the compromise and settlement of disputes. 293 Similarly,
Rule 411 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 294 excludes evidence that a
person was or was not insured against liability to prove that the per-
son acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully.295 The policy underly-
ing the exclusion of such evidence is that proof of liability insurance is
not relevant to the issue of fault, and that the introduction of evidence
291. Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states:
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or
offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or
attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or
amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its
amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is
likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion of any evidence
otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of
compromise negotiations. This rule also does not require exclusion when the
evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a
witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a
criminal investigation of prosecution.
FED. R. EVID. 408.
292. Id.
293. FED. R. EvID. 408 advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 227 ("A more
consistently impressive ground is promotion of the public policy favoring the compromise and
settlement of disputes.").
294. Rule 411 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states:
Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible
upon the issue whether the person acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully.
This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of insurance against liability
when offered for another purpose, such as proof of agency, ownership, or control,
or bias or prejudice of a witness.
FED. R. EVID. 411.
295. Id.
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that a party was insured would prejudice the jury.296 The policies
underlying Rules 408 and 411 are therefore similar to the policies
behind Rule 407297 because they are concerned with excluding highly
prejudicial evidence that has minimal probative value.298 Finally, like
Rule 407, Rules 408 and 411 provide exceptions from their
operation.299
Because Rules 408 and 411 exclude evidence for policy concerns
similar to those of Rule 407, one would expect all three rules to have
parallel exceptions allowing the use of such evidence for impeachment
purposes. But this is not the case. Rules 408 and 411 appear to pro-
vide for only a narrow use of evidence for impeachment purposes as
an exception to their general rule of exclusion in contrast to Rule
407's broad impeachment exception. Rules 408 and 411 expressly
allow the use of compromise evidence and evidence of insurance
against liability to prove bias or prejudice of a witness. 300 On the
other hand, Rule 407 apparently provides for a broader use of subse-
quent measures evidence for impeachment because it lists impeach-
ment as an illustrative exception to the Rule.30'
Commentators disagree as to whether Rule 408 limits the use of
compromise evidence to impeach solely to show the bias or prejudice
of a witness.30 2 The disagreement is over whether compromise evi-
dence may be used as a form of prior inconsistent statement to
impeach a witness who testifies in a contradictory fashion. Commen-
296. FED. R. EvID. 411 advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 230 ("At best the
inference of fault from the fact of insurance coverage is a tenuous one, as is its converse. More
important,. . . knowledge of the presence or absence of liability insurance would induce juries
to decide cases on improper grounds.").
297. FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 225. The exclusion of
evidence of subsequent measures is based upon the following two policy grounds:
The [subsequent measure] is not in fact an admission, since the conduct is equally
consistent with injury by mere accident or through contributory negligence....
[Another] ground for exclusion rests on a social policy of encouraging people to
take, or at least not discouraging them from taking, steps in furtherance of added
safety.
Id. at 226.
298. See supra notes 291-96.
299. Rule 408 also provides: "This rule.., does not require exclusion when the evidence is
offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a
contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or
prosecution." FED. R. EvID. 408. Rule 411 provides in part: "This rule does not require the
exclusion of evidence of insurance against liability when offered for another purpose, such as
proof of agency, ownership, or control, or bias or prejudice of a witness." FED. R. EvID. 411.
300. See supra notes 291 & 294.
301. Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides in relevant part: "This rule does
not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another
purpose, such as... impeachment." FED. R. EvID. 407.
302. See infra notes 303-18 and accompanying text.
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tators who believe that evidence of compromises offered. should not be
used to impeach a witness who has testified in a contradictory fashion
assert two principal arguments. First, they argue that the use of com-
promise evidence to contradict an inconsistent statement undercuts
the policy behind Rule 408:
The philosophy of ... Rule [408] is to allow the parties to drop
their guard and to talk freely and loosely without fear that a con-
cession made to advance negotiations will be used at trial. Opening
the door to impeachment evidence on a regular basis may well
result in more restricted negotiations.3 "3
In addition, these commentators argue that the prejudicial impact on
future negotiations as a result of admitting the evidence will outweigh
any probative value the statements may have.3°
The commentators' second argument relies upon the conference
report drafted by the House of Representatives regarding Rule 408.
The report states that "evidence of conduct or statements made in
compromise negotiations is not admissible. ' 30 5 Because the inconsis-
tent statement in question was made during compromise negotiations,
one commentator argues that it falls under the umbrella of the Rule's
exclusion.30 6 A counterargument is that Rule 408 excludes only "evi-
dence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations"
when offered to prove liability for, or the invalidity of, the claim. 30 7
Because the compromise evidence is being offered to impeach the wit-
ness and not prove liability for, or invalidity of, the claim, it should be
admissible. One problem with this latter view is that it undermines
the policy purpose of Rule 408.
It should be noted that the linguistic differences between Rules
407 and 408 do not support the view that evidence of compromise
negotiations should not be admissible for broad impeachment pur-
poses. One can argue that the text of Rule 407 lists only "impeach-
ment" among its exceptions without any further qualification, and
thereby suggests that impeachment be interpreted broadly. Moreover,
the text of Rule 408 lists only one form of impeachment-to prove
bias or prejudice of a witness-thereby indicating that evidence of
compromise negotiations should only be admissible for this purpose.
303. S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL, at 172 (2d
ed. 1977).
304. Id.
305. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 7098, 7099.
306. See M. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 408.1, at 256 (1981) ("It is
nevertheless suggested that conduct or statements made during compromise negotiations
should not be admissible as inconsistent statements to impeach.").
307. FED. R. EVID. 408.
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This argument is countered, however, by the advisory committee's
note to Rule 408, which states that the exception provisions of that
Rule are merely illustrative, and that only the most common use of
compromise evidence is listed as an exception to the Rule.3 °8
Commentators who believe that compromise evidence should be
admissible to impeach witnesses who have testified inconsistently
argue the proposition that "protecting the settlement process to the
point of shielding apparently perjured testimony [is] excessive. 30 9
Professors Louisell and Mueller find support for this position in a
joint statement submitted by the Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure and the Advisory Committee on Rules of Evi-
dence, which they assert strongly hinted that the use of compromise
statements for impeachment includes impeachment by contradic-
tion.3 10 Although Rule 408 was still in its gestation period at the time
this statement was written, it was made by the standing committee
and the advisory committee in response to a concern of some govern-
ment agencies that Rule 408 would encourage misrepresentations dur-
ing settlement negotiations. The advisory committee stated that the
Rule would not encourage misrepresentations during settlement talks,
because "the rule discloses that its protection applies only when the
evidence is offered for the purpose of establishing liability for or inva-
lidity of a claim. ' 311 Professors Louisell and Mueller conclude that
the evidence of compromise negotiations should be admissible because
it is being offered to impeach, and not to prove liability for, or the
invalidity of, a claim.312
Professors Wright and Graham ultimately reach the same con-
clusion as Professors Louisell and Mueller. They, however, support
their position by a different argument. Professors Wright and Gra-
ham consider the advisory committee intent argument "opaque,
3 13
and term the supporting testimony as a "calculated effort to obscure
the issue [rather] than an endorsement of [the] use of negotiation
308. FED. R. EvID. 408 advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 227 ("The illustrative
situations mentioned in the rule are supported by the authorities.").
309. D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 23, at 470.
310. Id.
311. Federal Rules of Evidence: Hearings on H.R. 5463 Before the Senate Comm on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 53, 59 (1974) (joint statement of the Standing Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure and the Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence of the
Judicial Conference to the Senate Judiciary Committee).
312. See D. LoUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 23, at 447-48. Professors Louisell and
Mueller responded to the quote by stating, "In other words, Rule 408 does not bar statements
in settlement talks when offered to impeach at trial." Id. (footnote omitted). For the text of
the quote, see note 304.
313. C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 4, § 5314, at 285.
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statements for. impeachment purposes. ' 14 Instead, they focus on
Rule 102, which states in part that "[t]hese rules shall be construed
...to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings
justly determined."31 Given the express intent of the advisory com-
mittee to maintain fairness and truth, Professors Wright and Graham
argue that "[ilt is difficult to see why the law would care to encourage
falsehood .... The purpose of Rule 408 is to foster 'complete candor'
between the parties, not to protect false representations." '316 Conse-
quently, they conclude:
[I]t would seem that the injunction in Rule 102 to interpret the
rules so as [to] foster the values of 'fairness' and 'truth' should lead
courts to conclude that prior inconsistent statements in the course.
of settlement negotiations should be admitted to impeach a party
who testifies. If so, then only the fact the statement was made
should be admitted, not that it was made during settlement
negotiations.317
In recognizing that, there are valid arguments on both sides of this
issue, Professors Wright and Graham realistically accept the fact that
it will be up to the courts ultimately to decide whether evidence of
compromise negotiations will be admitted for impeaching a witness
who has given inconsistent testimony.318
A resolution of this issue in the federal courts could be effected
by accepting Professors Wright and Graham's argument that fairness
must be maintained. In addition, it is plausible that the enumerated
exceptions to Rules 407 and 408 are only illustrative and that, there-
fore, the use of compromise evidence to impeach an inconsistent state-
ment is not expressly forbidden. Nevertheless, it should be left to the
trial judge to decide, in accordance with Rule 403,319 whether admit-
ting such evidence would unduly prejudice the jury, and therefore cir-
cumvent the policy behind the Rule.
A model for resolving these questions on the state level is shown
by the example of Alaska.320 The Alaska Legislature added an adden-
dum to its version of Rule 408 that states: "[E]xclusion is required
where the sole purpose for offering the evidence is to impeach a party
by showing a prior inconsistent statement. ' 321 Any state legislature
314. Id. (footnote omitted).
315. FED. R. EvID. 102.
316. C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 4, § 5314, at 286 (footnotes omitted).
317. Id. at 287 (footnotes omitted).
318. Id. at 286-87.
319. For the relevant text of Rule 403, see supra note 282.
320. ALASKA R. CT. Rule 408 (1979).
321. Id.
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that wants to avoid the use of compromise evidence to impeach an
inconsistent statement should take similar action and statutorily pro-
hibit such impeachment.
Comparing the use of impeachment under Rules 411 and 407 is
neither as complex, nor as debated as the comparison between Rules
408 and 407. One reason why impeachment under Rule 411 is princi-
pally used to prove bias or prejudice of a witness, rather than to chal-
lenge inconsistent statements, is that most defendants will not raise
the issue of insurance fearing that it will adversely affect the jury. It is
common, however, for a defendant to examine a witness who has had
some connection with an insurance company-whether he is an
employee or an agent, or merely a witness who gave a statement to an
interested insurance carrier. In these situations, the plaintiff is per-
mitted to offer proof of insurance to prove a bias or prejudice on
behalf of the witness. Nevertheless, if the insurance issue were to
arise to impeach in circumstances that did not indicate bias or preju-
dice of a witness-that is, to prove an inconsistent statement-the
issue would raise the same concerns and considerations previously
discussed in the comparison of Rules 407 and 408.322
This comparison of Rule 407 with Rules 408 and 411 should not
lead to the conclusion that the impeachment exception in Rule 407
should be exercised without restraint. Trial judges and counsel must
never lose sight of the policy underlying Rule 407. In applying the
impeachment exception, a balance should be struck between the pro-
motion of Rule 407's policy and the assurance that truth and fairness
are achieved among the litigants.
V. CONCLUSION
This Comment argues that the impeachment exception to Rule
407, if properly applied, can serve as a useful tool to assure that fair-
322. The concerns and considerations previously discussed in the comparison of Rules 407
and 408, and which undoubtedly would be pertinent to the comparison of Rules 407 and 411,
take two forms. First, permitting evidence of liability insurance to impeach an inconsistent
statement may undercut the policy of Rule 411 which seeks to avoid any inference of fault
which the possession of liability insurance may create. See FED. R. EVID. 411. Such a
concern, however, must be weighed against the possibility that refusing to allow evidence of
liability insurance to impeach an inconsistent statement may ultimately promote perjured
testimony, and disparage truth and fairness among the litigants-the underlying purpose of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. See FED. R. EvID. 102.
Second, it can be argued that the list of exceptions in Rule 411 are merely illustrative, and
therefore, evidence of liability insurance is admissible to impeach an inconsistent statement. It
is likewise feasible, however, to counterargue that the list of exceptions in Rule 411 is
exhaustive, and therefore, evidence of liability insurance is not admissible to impeach an
inconsistent statement.
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ness and truth are not sacrificed in litigation. On the other hand, the
impeachment exception, if used improperly, can have an adverse
effect on the social policy concerns that Rule 407 seeks to promote.
Given this tension, this Comment attempts to balance the social inter-
ests promoted by the subsequent measures Rule and the litigation
interests promoted by the impeachment exception.
Overall, the courts have gone a considerable way in achieving
this balance. First, courts hold that the use of subsequent measures
evidence to impeach a witness who testifies either in a false or mis-
leading manner, or incorrectly, about the safety of the allegedly haz-
ardous condition is admissible. A contrary holding would unduly
disadvantage the plaintiff by not allowing false assertions to be
impeached with contradictory evidence of subsequent measures, and
would thereby undercut the intentions of the drafters of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, who sought that truth be ascertained and proceed-
ings justly determined by the application of the Rules.323
Second, courts hold that a defendant or his witness who testifies
only that the allegedly hazardous condition was safe is not subject to
impeachment. If, however, the defendant or his witness testifies in a
more extravagant manner-that the place or product is the "safest,"
the "best," or that "all reasonable care was being used"-then he is
subject to impeachment by the introduction of evidence of subsequent
measures. This distinction protects the defendant from a circumven-
tion of the Rule and an unfair inference of negligence by the jury,
while penalizing a defendant, or his witness, who attempts to manipu-
late the Rule to gain an unfair advantage. In the former situation, the
defendant or his witness merely states a valid opinion that is necessary
for the defense of the case. Evidence of a subsequent measure that is
used to impeach would create the inference that the allegedly hazard-
ous condition was unsafe, which is precisely the conclusion that the
Rule seeks to avoid. Furthermore, if impeachment were allowed, the
defendant would never be able to call a witness to testify about the
safety of the allegedly hazardous condition.
Moreover, in the latter situation, the defendant, or his witness,
goes beyond what is necessary for the defendant's defense, and states
an aggressive opinion that deserves to be subject to impeachment with
the evidence of subsequent measures taken by the defendant. The fed-
eral courts are silent as to whether this distinction between a witness
who testifies that his place or product was safe, and one who testifies
that his place or product was the safest, should be applied to witnesses
or defendants who ordered or had control over the subsequent mea-
323. See FED. R. EvID. 102.
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sure. This Comment argues that federal courts should apply this dis-
tinction to witnesses who ordered or had control over the subsequent
measure, because the Rule excluding evidence of subsequent measures
is just as susceptible to circumvention regardless of whether the wit-
ness ordered, or had control over, the subsequent measure.
The federal courts, however, have failed to achieve an optimal
balance because they have condoned the use of subsequent measures
evidence to impeach a defendant, or his witness, called on direct
examination by the plaintiff's counsel. Although the Federal Rules
permit a plaintiff's counsel to call an adverse witness on direct exami-
nation and subsequently to impeach the adverse witness with evidence
of subsequent measures,3 24 such tactics are inconsistent with the his-
torical use of the impeachment exception. Historically, the defendant,
or his witness, was the aggressive and manipulative party, and the
plaintiff was the victim. Therefore, prior to tie enactment of Rule
407, courts sought to protect the litigation interests of the plaintiff,
and to thwart any undue advantage the defendant sought to achieve.
In its present use in the federal courts, however, the plaintiff has
become the aggressor and manipulator, by converting the historically
defensive shield of the impeachment exception into a sword.
To combat this abuse of the exception, this Comment suggests
that evidence of subsequent measures not be admissible to impeach a
defendant, or his witness, called on direct examination by the plain-
tiff.325 A less drastic means of curbing the abuse of the impeachment
exception would be to permit the trial judge to ensure that the defend-
ant was the true initiator of the inconsistency. Furthermore, the trial
judge could ensure that the defendant or his witness would not be
subject to impeachment with evidence of subsequent measures for
merely answering affirmatively the question by the plaintiff's counsel,
"Do you think that the allegedly hazardous condition was safe?" or
answering negatively the question, "Would it not be safer to perform
the measures you subsequently undertook?"
The impeachment exception should be respected by courts and
litigants for its merits as well as its pitfalls. Applying the impeach-
ment exception in the manner suggested promotes both the social
concerns of the Rule as well as the litigation interests of the parties.
ROBERT K. HARRIS
324. FED. R. EvID. 607.
325. See Note, supra note 164, at 683 ("The most effective way to eliminate the dangers
inherent in the impeachment exception would be to disallow the admission of evidence of
subsequent remedial conduct to impeach a witness called by the plaintiff.").
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